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Abstract 
In the face of considerable scepticism from some British commentators, elections by secret ballot 
and adult suffrage emerged as central features of the end of British rule in Africa. This article 
considers the trajectories of electoral politics in three territories – Ghana (Gold Coast), Kenya and 
Uganda. It shows that in each of these the ballot box came to provide a point of convergence for the 
disparate ambitions of nationalist politicians, colonial policy-makers and a hopeful, restive public: 
performing order, asserting maturity and equality, and staking a claim to prosperity. Late-colonial 
elections, we argue, constrained political possibility even as they offered citizenship, presenting the 
developmentalist state as the only possible future and ensuring substantial continuities from late-
colonialism to independence. They also established a linkage between nationhood, adulthood and 
the ballot that was to have enduring political force. Yet at the same time, they established elections 
as a space for a local politics of clientelism, and for kinds of claims-making and accountability that 
were to complicate post-independence projects of nation-building.   
 
In 1958, Britain’s Colonial Office initiated a policy discussion on the role of elections in the end of 
empire. The discussion ran over the next two years – even as the pace of decolonization quickened 
across Africa.1 Elections had become an occasional aspect of the negotiated transfer of power to 
British-ruled territories decades earlier; by the early 1960s they were routine. But when a document 
– tellingly titled ‘Democracy in backward countries’ – finally emerged from the discussion in early 
1960, it concluded that ‘Westminster democracy cannot be expected to work well in countries with 
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low standards of living and education’. Nevertheless, the document argued that, since international 
expectation and African nationalists demanded elections before independence, they must be held.2 
The doubts expressed in ‘Democracy in backward countries’ were not unusual, as we shall 
show below. Yet British planning, as much as international opinion or nationalist demands, had 
come to focus on elections by universal adult suffrage and the secret ballot.  Critically, these were 
relative novelties in Europe at the time; and in India, universal suffrage had followed several years 
after the end of empire, rather than preceding it. So why did they become the norm? Why did 
African politicians demand such elections? And why did the restive subjects of late-colonial states 
queue up to register and vote? What part, in short, did elections play in the entangled processes of 
decolonization and nationalist mobilization?  
Prominent as they were in the end of empire, late-colonial elections attracted considerable 
academic attention at the time,3 but have rarely been studied by historians. That neglect is perhaps 
unsurprising: the rapid disappearance of multi-party politics across most of the continent within a 
few years of independence made these polls seem irrelevant, no more than a curious ritual 
precursor to the lowering of the flag. But universal suffrage and a (nominally) secret ballot never 
entirely went away.4 And, since 1990, the return of multi-party politics across much of Africa has 
drawn academic interest back to the ballot box. While the great bulk of the consequent literature 
has been explicitly concerned with the promotion and measurement of democracy, we take our 
inspiration from a more critical historical and ethnographic work – on Africa, and other parts of the 
world – that has asked how the secret ballot and universal suffrage have been imagined, and used, 
as ways to shape political subjectivities; that is, people’s sense of political possibilities, and their own 
place in political action.5 We use those comparative insights to argue that late-colonial elections – 
which were vast administrative ‘operations’, as well as vivid political events – were not irrelevant. 
Nor were they – as a minority of studies have suggested – either preeminent tools of a British 
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manipulation which shaped the whole process, or simply the innovation that unintentionally ‘dug 
the grave’ of empire (though the latter is perhaps closer to our view).6 
We argue this through a study of three parts of British-ruled Africa – Ghana (formerly Gold 
Coast) in West Africa, and Uganda and Kenya in East Africa. Chosen to exemplify the variation of 
local circumstance, these case studies also reveal commonality, showing how in each case imperial 
contradictions and nationalist ambitions combined to make elections seem a powerful tool with 
which to do different kinds of political work. The performance of the ballot narrowed down the 
multiple possible political futures that beckoned at the end of empire. They were able to do so 
because that effect was not immediately apparent to all those who were drawn into a vivid, 
emergent, electoral culture. Elections asserted the primacy of development as the purpose of 
legitimate government but simultaneously encouraged clientelism. They ushered voters into an 
apparently national citizenship but facilitated parochial politics. They created the impression of 
political equality but gendered political representation.  In this particular moment of promise and 
uncertainty, elections captured the imagination and energy of administrators, politicians and a wider 
public, who all looked to elections as they pursued multiple visions of citizenship and nationhood.  
We begin with a brief narrative of elections in the three case studies, which shows how 
British administrators and politicians first turned to elections in a bid to prolong empire by offering 
African allies the prize of privileged inclusion in a liberal project. However, African nationalists seized 
the opportunity to press more dramatic claims. As multiple forces unravelled empire, both British 
and nationalists committed themselves to a logic that foregrounded elections by adult suffrage as 
the expression of a powerful linkage of adulthood, citizenship and sovereignty. However, while 
colonial administrators were drawn to elections as a way to discipline nationalist leaders, African 
politicians came to these events as a means to legitimise their leadership, and ordinary people as a 
means to select those who could secure benefits for their community. These dynamics are important 
not only for understanding politics at this critical historical juncture, but also for understanding the 
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longer-lasting appeal of elections during the one-party state and, more recently, into the multi-party 
era. 7   
I 
All three territories were colonial creations, and their creation had been rooted in violence and in 
ideas of racial difference. Over those profound similarities, each was distinctive. Trade in gold, 
slaves, plant oils and then cocoa had moved wealth, ideas and people between what became Ghana 
and Europe and America since the sixteenth century; one consequence was the presence of an 
unusually large African elite, of chiefs, businessmen and professionals (including lawyers).  There 
were tensions within that elite: between chiefs and the educated, between those from the 
southernmost part of the territory and those from the kingdom of Ashanti.8 But self-confidence and 
a sense of entitlement united this group – and divided them from the great majority of the 
population, including those who had found opportunity, but little security, as petty traders, teachers, 
and clerks in the developing colonial economy and bureaucracy.9 Meanwhile the north of Ghana lay 
largely beyond the economic, social and educational networks, which bound the southern half of the 
territory together.  
Ghana had no white settlers; Kenya, by contrast, was a settler colony, created in the rush of colonial 
expansion at the end of the nineteenth century. Alongside white settlers there had developed a 
large Asian population, involved in commerce and in the colonial bureaucracy. There was little space 
here for the kind of African elite that had emerged in Ghana: Kenya’s late-colonial African politicians 
mostly began their careers as teachers or as low-ranking employees of government. The settlers 
shaped the politics of the end of empire; clamorous and insecure, they had built a position of 
economic and political privilege which rested entirely on the state and its coercive power.10 The 
crucial moment came when, after bloodily containing an insurgency, the British government decided 
that it could no longer afford – economically, or politically – the cost of supporting that privilege.11 
Yet that decision left open a further question: what would be the shape of an independent Kenya, 
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and how would it be governed?12 Neighbouring Uganda had few white settlers, but many Asians, 
and its politics were often conducted in the shadow of debates over Kenya. Yet another factor was 
more important: the kingdom of Buganda. The establishment of British rule had rested on a tense, 
and often violent, relationship with this kingdom, and the kabaka, or king, had an accordingly 
privileged position.13 The hierarchy of chiefs under the kabaka, while sometimes in conflict with him, 
had developed both their status and their wealth through the kingdom’s distinctive position within 
what was formally the protectorate of Uganda; while a wider population in Buganda might resent 
the impostures of chiefs, the kingdom had a powerful affective hold, and commanded widespread 
support.14 The desire of both kabaka and chiefs to secure Bugandan privilege was a constant feature 
of the politics of the end of empire; in tension as it was with the aspirations of Uganda’s emergent 
political parties, led by a group of teachers, clerks and local traders from across the territory whose 
idea of the future offered no space for Buganda’s distinct ambition.15  
The colonial state in all three had revolved around the production and maintenance of racial 
difference; and in all three it had launched on late-colonial projects which looked to development 
for legitimacy, but had made available a language of progress that allowed African trade unionists 
and politicians to shake the authority of the state, opening up a sense of political possibilities that 
was both enabling and alarming.16 Those similarities underlay a pattern of late-colonial electoral 
history; apparent first in Ghana, then repeated a few years later in Kenya and Uganda. In each case – 
in Ghana in 1951, Kenya in 1957 and Uganda in 1958 – first elections were held in an attempt to 
breathe new life into the late-colonial state, on the way to a future self-government whose 
timetable still remained unsettled.  In each, carefully devised conditions to control the outcome of 
those elections failed.17 The African politicians who won elected office refused to accept their 
assigned role as a privileged but subordinate elite. Instead, they called for rapid progress to 
independence. The door at which they knocked was already opening rapidly, pushed by an 
international context that was depriving empire of legitimacy and by a wider process of claims-
making enabled by the late-colonial language of development.18 Empire was becoming unaffordable, 
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politically as well as economically: for imperial powers the pressing need now was to assert the 
legitimacy of the institutions of stateness that they had created – administration, police, judiciary – 
so that these might be passed complete into African hands.  
Former radicals were now moderates in British eyes, their electoral ambitions suddenly desirable; 
and in each territory second elections were held – in Ghana as a step to self-government, in Kenya 
and Uganda to produce what were called ‘responsible’ ministers, now with the expectation that 
independence was imminent. In each case, the outcome of those second elections proved 
problematic. In Kenya, continued British equivocation over the future privileges of the settlers 
combined with – and encouraged – competing African views of the future to produce a ‘frustrated 
election’ in 1961, which increased rivalries and produced no clear result.19 The apparently conclusive 
results of Ghana’s 1954 elections were quickly clouded by demands from Ashanti, and the north, for 
distinctive political status, articulated most vociferously by the ambiguously-named National 
Liberation Movement (NLM).20  Uganda’s 1961 elections were almost entirely boycotted in Buganda. 
That boycott delivered victory to one of two competing parties, but at the same time robbed the 
elections of legitimacy.21  
In each case, third elections were held, as British politicians looked increasingly frantically for a way 
to pass imperial responsibilities to Africans. The precise balance of dynamics varied: in Ghana, it was 
the British who really insisted on these last elections – confident as they (rightly) were that Kwame 
Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party (CPP), which had won in 1951 and 1954, would secure a clear 
victory and ensure a unitary constitution for independent Ghana.22 In Uganda, the British found 
common ground with the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), the party defeated in 1961, when the 
latter made a deal with the kingdom of Buganda. While both British and the UPC had previously 
insisted on direct elections across Uganda, it was now agreed that Buganda would hold elections to 
its own parliament, the lukiiko, which would then choose Buganda’s representatives to the new 
‘national assembly’. With the support of those indirectly-elected members, the UPC emerged with a 
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clear majority from the 1962 elections, and formed independent Uganda’s first government.23   In 
Kenya, particular British concerns (over the settlers, military bases, and political complexion of a 
future government) focussed on the perceived danger posed by radicals in what was evidently the 
most powerful party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) – a party that, like the Colonial Office 
in London, favoured a unitary and centralized political future for Kenya. The British briefly hesitated 
over elections, hoping that a split in KANU would allow ‘moderates’ to join with the rival Kenya 
African Democratic Union (KADU) – whose ideas on economics and property rights the British 
favoured, even as they doubted the viability of KADU’s plans for decentralised administration.24 But 
then the urgent sense of the need to hand over responsibility impelled a sudden acceleration; polls 
in May 1963 were followed by independence under a KANU government at the end of that year.  
There was much that was rushed and opportunistic about these events, and it is hard to see 
a consistent plan on the part of any involved. Yet the repeating pattern of elections – in these, and 
other territories – makes more insistent the query: how and why did multiple different actors, across 
Africa, pursuing different projects, turn to the ballot? 
II 
As Karuna Mantena has argued, the British presented both a universalist justification and a 
culturalist alibi to explain their empire.25 These were mutually contradictory.  The first was avowedly 
liberal: empire, it suggested, was a tutelary project that sought to spread British institutions, and the 
goal was to turn subjects into citizens, and colonial possessions into nations. The second was rooted 
in difference and racial categorization: empire was necessary because its subjects were inherently 
incapable of ruling themselves justly, and required the British to govern them.26 The tension 
between these visions ran through an imperial history which can be written in terms of the episodic 
dominance of one or the other; after 1940, the ‘universalistic, progressive project’ was in the 
ascendant, with development – constitutional, as well as economic and social – as the key term.27  
Yet the universalist vision entailed its own contradiction: the imperial claim to authority required the 
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constant reproduction of the difference that it claimed to eradicate.28 After 1945, that contradiction 
manifested itself repeatedly, as British advocates of development and modernization expressed 
their uncertainty over African capacities in what Uday Mehta has called the language of ‘presumed 
infantilism’; Africans were children, not yet ready for a future for which they required more 
education.29 The Kenyan trade unionist and politician Tom Mboya ventriloquized that strategy of 
exclusion with bitter accuracy: ‘“You cannot be free because you are not sufficiently educated”’.30 
Adult suffrage and the secret ballot exposed this contradiction most fully. British 
commentators could – and did – point to metropolitan history for evidence that the slow extension 
of the franchise was the root of political stability.31  The cautious schemes to develop representative 
African local government mooted in the 1940s were predicated on the belief that few Africans were 
ready for the vote: they implied the possibility of a universalist vision of adulthood and citizenship, 
yet withheld it from most Africans in a language that linked education, responsibility and 
experience.32 British observers repeatedly insisted both that irresponsibility made most Africans 
unfit for suffrage and that illiteracy made them practically unable to cast a secret vote; as The Times 
put it, ‘[t]here are mechanical means whereby primitive tribes can be made to go through the 
motions of the ballot, but such a process is neither dignified nor meaningful’.33 Ghana’s 1951 
elections chose only 38 of the 84 members of the assembly; the rest were nominated by councils of 
chiefs, by business and industry, or by the governor. Of those 38, only five were directly elected;  the 
rest were chosen by ‘electoral colleges’. Even this degree of popular choice was regarded by many 
Britons with incredulity: this was ‘handing a native a pistol and carefully explaining its mechanism’, 
wrote one journalist, while others wrote multiple, mocking, stories of African incomprehension in 
the face of the ‘white man’s new magic’ of the ballot box.34  
The CPP’s success against this loaded system drove an immediate British reappraisal of 
Nkrumah. Previously denounced, he was now embraced as a moderate. He used that position to 
demand direct and secret voting by adult suffrage in the next elections. Alarmed as they were by the 
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idea, the British accepted this as the price of moderation.35 But at same time in Kenya, it was still 
assumed that adult suffrage ‘will not be possible for many years to come’.36 The presence of white 
settlers in East Africa made the ‘ignorant, vote-endowed savage’ an unacceptable prospect.37  The 
aim, instead – as it had been in Ghana only a few years before – was that a managed franchise would 
reward a modest cohort of responsible subjects and ensure their loyal cooperation in continued 
British rule: ‘the vote must be reserved at present for those who, by reason of their education, 
achievements or experience can be expected to make sound use of it’.38 In 1957 a British 
parliamentary delegation to Kenya reasserted the point: universal suffrage was impossible where 
the population was ‘immature and undeveloped’.39 When, in 1959, the electoral expert William 
Mackenzie argued for a rapid extension of the franchise in Kenya, on the grounds that the only way 
to develop responsibility was to allow Africans to exercise it, British officials and politicians insisted 
that Africans were unready for the individual responsibility of the vote – and therefore unready for 
collective self-government.40   
But in East Africa, as in Ghana a few years earlier, adult suffrage was rapidly conceded when 
it became clear that British rule was unsustainable, and the urgent need was to find an ‘inheritance 
elite’ to whom power could be handed.41  At that point the urgent need to rationalize and confer 
respectability on this handover made the universal franchise suddenly attractive as a way to conjure 
a citizenry, and a nation.42 The crucial moment in East Africa was between late 1959 and early 1960; 
even as the report on ‘Democracy in backward countries’ was in preparation, a statement by the 
Commonwealth Relations Office affirming the principle of the qualified franchise was drafted, and 
then abruptly suppressed.43 Elections now offered a way for the British to reassure themselves – and 
persuade others – that they were handing power to men who had been moulded into the ‘norms of 
modernity’.44 
For many Africans too, the contradictions of late-colonial thought confirmed that voting was 
the badge of maturity. Against the infantilizing rhetoric of late colonialism, ‘adult suffrage’ had 
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double significance: to have the vote was to be accepted as a responsible adult, as well as to have 
the right to participate. Long before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights claimed adult 
suffrage and the secret ballot for all, the franchise had marked status: in Kenya, white settlers, 
Asians and Arabs could cast  individual ballots from the 1920s, and the political voice of white 
privilege by the 1940s was the ‘Electors’ Union.45 In 1945, the exile intellectuals of the Pan-African 
Congress had demanded adult suffrage.46 Mackenzie’s writing, intended for colonial audiences, 
made a further point explicit: elections by adult suffrage and secret ballot were the ultimate mark of 
legitimate government.47   Since the 1920s, international precedent had, haltingly, suggested that 
elections expressed a collective claim to sovereignty: to hold elections by adult suffrage and secret 
ballot was to prove national maturity and readiness for self-rule.48 Colonial reluctance underscored 
the value of the vote for African nationalists, as a practical tool of politics, and as a claim to a future 
in which Africans would be equal. African nationalism was a particular kind of challenge to colonial 
rule. It defied the infantilizing logic of difference, and looked to a future of equality, of progress, of 
science – of change.49 Election was not in itself a novel idea in late-colonial Africa; customary 
practice and the associational forms of colonialism – school, local government, cooperatives – had 
made familiar the techniques of ‘acclamation’ at open meetings, public voting by queuing or by 
show of hands, and indirect voting by delegates. But by the late 1940s nationalists focussed political 
claims on the adult franchise and the secret ballot; in Ghana it was at least plausible to claim that 
there was a ‘popular cry throughout the country for universal adult suffrage’; by 1952 in Uganda, the 
demand for freedom and equality ‘in this fast moving civilisation of the Atomic Age’ was seen as 
bound up with adult suffrage.50 
In Kenya, the logic of liberal universalism became nationalists’ weapon against settler claims 
to privilege; their demands for adult suffrage expressed this in terms of the ‘equality’ and ‘civic 
responsibility’ of the ‘individual citizen’.51 Nationalists gleefully appropriated the logic of electoral 
progression to adulthood, arguing that in 1957 ‘newly franchised citizens’ in Kenya had ‘displayed an 
enviably high degree of political maturity’.52 The call for ‘undiluted democracy’ became ubiquitous, 
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and inseparable from the ideas of ‘full nationhood’ and equality. In this vein, Mboya wrote an open 
letter to Kenya’s white and Asian political leaders in 1960, demanding electoral equality: ‘The 
African, for a long-time a third-class citizen in his own country is conscious of the rising status of 
fellow Africans elsewhere . . . He simply wants to be accepted as a fellow and equal human being’.53 
When the government in Uganda refused to accept adult suffrage for Africans, Obote denounced 
this as a ‘complete degradation of the African mentality’; in plangent tone another Kenyan politician 
explicitly linked adult suffrage, independence and adulthood: ‘we know that only in independence 
shall we be respectable men and women of dignity’.54 
Initially hostile, the British came to welcome this once the early transfer of power became 
the goal: if colonial territories were ready for self-government, then their people must be citizens, 
ready for the responsibility of the vote. In 1954, Frederick Crawford, then deputy governor of Kenya, 
had mocked African enthusiasm for the secret ballot and adult suffrage in terms that echoed the 
British press coverage of Ghana’s 1951 elections: ‘they believe there is some juju in it’, he sneered. 
By the end of the decade, as governor of Uganda, he declared that adult suffrage was ‘desirable both 
politically and practically’.55 The secret ballot was the unquestioned corollary of adult suffrage; 
debate over  how to make this possible for illiterate voters led to experimentation and variety of 
practice which quickly gave way to a uniform system within each territory. In Ghana, where voters 
deemed to be educated had marked their ballot papers in 1951, the need for a ‘common electoral 
system throughout the country’ led to a system of multiple ballot boxes  - with voters placing an 
unmarked paper in the box of their preferred candidate - from 1954; the ballot boxes themselves 
were screened from view to make the vote secret.56 The same procedure was came to be used in 
Uganda; in Kenya, by contrast, all voters were expected to mark a choice on their ballot paper, and 
all papers went into a single box.  
These abrupt changes in British policy were driven by imperial expedience. But they were 
possible partly because elections had – as elsewhere in Africa – become a means to pursue the 
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disciplinary ambitions of late-colonialism.57 Colonial officials had long understood their role as one of 
bringing order to Africa, and had habitually combined the open violence of the bullet and baton 
charge with the insidious power of the list and the rubber stamp. ‘Operation elections’ – as one 
official called the 1951 polls in Ghana – offered a new field of endeavour in both authorising and 
euphemizing coercion.58  As the electorate grew rapidly, elections – especially the final pre-
independence elections – became massive events involving the mobilisation and display of state 
power: 126,000 voters registered in Kenya for the 1957 elections; more than two million for those in 
1963. Continuing the military metaphor, Kenya’s governor called the 1961 elections ‘an 
outstandingly successful operation’.59 These were powerful performances, which cast the population 
as responsible citizens – the focus of an educational campaign of leaflets, posters and instructional 
films which taught them how to register, queue and cast their ballots under the watchful eye of 
police.60 These were, as British officials and commentators repeatedly asserted, ‘orderly’ events.61 
Their cast included an emerging cadre of African administrators, who worked with their British 
mentors to run the electoral process, requisitioning vehicles, typewriters and staff from every 
government department to do so.62 It also drew in thousands of – mostly male – extra polling station 
staff.63 These were often teachers and senior school students, who had the necessary skills of 
literacy and a familiarity with lists and colonial spatial order, and whose participation in elections 
flattered their own sense of distinctive status – particularly since polling stations were often in 
schools.64 The audience for this performance was, in part, the cast itself; through their involvement, 
they could see themselves anew, as citizens involved in an event that manifested the ‘triumph of 
bureaucratic discourse’.65 But there was a wider audience too: elections would ‘demonstrate to the 
world’ that a territory was ready for independence, as the Secretary of State assured Nkrumah in 
1956.66  Public, as well as politicians, were reminded of the global gaze: ‘the eyes of the world are 
upon us’, announced Kenya’s new, avowedly national, newspaper on the eve of the 1963 elections.67 
As empire threatened to tumble about their ears, the British turned to this vision as validation – this, 
after all, was what they had meant to do all along.  
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III 
British politicians and administrators pretended – to themselves, as much as to others – that adult 
suffrage and the secret ballot marked the culmination of the imperial project, rather than its 
collapse. They were able to do so because nationalist politicians were willing partners in these 
electoral projects: ‘expatriate administration and local politics walk[ed] in the same direction’.68 As 
argued above, nationalists seized on the contradictions in British alibis of empire to lay claim to the 
adult suffrage as a symbol of individual and collective maturity. But late-colonial elections did other 
work for nationalists. They too were concerned with discipline, and elections affirmed their 
distinctive status and claims to power. 
The major nationalist leaders of Ghana, Kenya and Uganda were all men; all with some 
education – some acquired locally, some the result of educational pilgrimages elsewhere in the 
world. All were Anglophone, and familiar with the forms and demands of bureaucracy. Nkrumah had 
studied in the US and spent time in the UK; Kenyatta had spent many years in the UK; Obote, after a 
brief period of higher education, had worked in Nairobi as a clerk. The local networks that they 
relied on to mobilise voters were also dominated by men with some limited school education: clerks, 
primary school teachers, and small businessmen. This was a time of hope, as well as discontent, and 
nationalists were well aware that popular discontent, and ambition, took many forms.69 Nationalists 
– and others – had encouraged defiance of colonial authority as they harnessed multiple 
resentments and ambitions in their cause: Nkrumah and Kenyatta had both been imprisoned.  With 
independence imminent, nationalist politicians in Ghana, Kenya and Uganda, like others across the 
continent, faced the task of reasserting authority: persuading the populace to become responsible 
citizens of a developmental state, and to forget the other ‘futures that might have been’.70  
Those other futures seemed alarmingly possible to those who considered themselves 
nationalists. It was not simply that colonial subjects had become unwilling to pay their taxes or obey 
officials; some actively sought to dismantle the state. In Kenya, Maasai dreamed of an ethnonational 
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state that would break the borders of Kenya and Tanganyika; ethnic Somalis supported the 
irredentist claims of the Republic of Somalia; coastal secessionists denied the very possibility of 
Kenyan sovereignty.71 In Uganda, the ambitions of Buganda threatened the very heart of the state; 
melodramatically announcing their plans for a separate independence, the members of the lukiiko 
insisted that ‘Buganda cannot sell her heritage for the purchase of Uganda’s independence’.72 In 
Ghana, dreams of a separate independence for east, or north, or for Ashanti, led to talk of civil war.73 
For late-colonial politicians, the survival and authority of the colonial state were by no means 
assured. 
So it was that in Ghana’s first elections, administrators were delighted to find that activists 
of Nkrumah’s CPP, who had established themselves as constant critics and opponents of 
government, were now urging people to pay tax and register as voters.74  In Uganda, where the 
abuse of power by chiefs had been a constant popular complaint, nationalist politicians showed little 
interest in challenging the effectively forced registration of voters in 1958 (despite local 
grumblings).75 In all three countries, over the cycle of pre-independence elections, politicians whom 
the British had previously regarded as dangerous radicals increasingly joined colonial administrators 
in urging the importance of law and order.76  They took up the same martial metaphors favoured by 
colonial officials: Nkrumah announced that the 1954 elections were ‘Operation 104’, as the CPP 
would win every one of the 104 seats.77 Like colonial officials, they evoked an international gaze to 
demand that the public ‘demonstrate to the rest of the world that Uganda people were mature and 
capable of governing themselves’.78 And they used the election campaign to make multiple 
disciplinary demands: ‘You must be peaceful and law-abiding citizens to expect a good return’, one 
KANU leader told voters;  both CPP and KANU used their manifestos to call for ‘hard work’.79 
Elections privileged the educated, and gendered participation, in another, even more direct 
way. To be nominated as a candidate required the payment of a cash deposit, the completion of 
forms and the collection of signatures, all to be presented at a set time and place for approval.80 To 
 15 
 
be a successful candidate required not just popularity, but the ability to mobilise voters to register, 
helping or encouraging them to fill in forms. Formal educational qualifications for candidates were 
expressed in terms of a requirement for literacy and fluency in English – a restrictive demand at the 
time. In Ghana, the requirement was not policed, but in both Uganda and Kenya, local language 
boards were formed which administered oral and written tests, which significant numbers of would-
be candidates failed.81 This combination of practical and regulatory demands excluded most men, 
and almost all women, from elected office. Among hundreds of aspirant candidates in these late 
colonial elections, women were only a handful: three in Ghana in 1954; one in Uganda in 1961 and 
again in 1962; one in Kenya in 1963. Just one of these candidates was successful, in Ghana in 1954. 
Those elected were, very largely, men in their thirties and forties; teachers were the single largest 
group.82 Women and older men could be, and were, voters and activists; but the electoral 
performance and socio-economic realities excluded them from other roles. 
Meanwhile, to question the value of adult suffrage and the secret ballot became almost 
impossible. In the late 1940s in Ghana, the committee of African professionals and chiefs who 
recommended universal suffrage had balanced their endorsement of the educational value of this 
with a recommendation for indirect voting in much of the territory, as a safeguard against an 
unpredictable popular vote.83 But after Nkrumah’s victory in 1951, none challenged either adult 
suffrage or the direct, secret ballot. In 1956, the opposition to the CPP sought local autonomy and an 
upper house of parliament dominated by chiefs: the constitution would be the curb on the 
consequences of adult suffrage.84 Accused by the CPP of showing ‘unreadiness for self-government’, 
they lost the election.85 In Kenya – where the African elite was much smaller, and even more 
fractured – some reportedly expressed doubts about adult suffrage in the early 1950s to the inquiry 
on ‘possible methods of African representation’ undertaken by a white colonial official, Walter 
Coutts.86 But by the early 1960s, no African politician called publicly for a limited franchise. Those 
who feared the consequences of direct adult suffrage instead sought protection in the constitutional 
arrangements for an upper house and regionalism.87 
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Only in Uganda was there a persistent – and successful – challenge to the very principle of 
direct adult suffrage for the nascent nation. A tiny educated elite had suggested a qualified franchise 
in the early 1950s; in 1958, the district council in Ankole had rejected even a qualified direct 
franchise, as the council was already composed of ‘the people who speak English best and represent 
Ankole well’.88 But it was the attitude of Buganda’s elite that proved most important. For the 
kabaka’s subjects to vote in a way that cast them as citizens of a putative Ugandan nation was 
unacceptable.89 However, voting itself could be acceptable: Buganda’s 1962 lukiiko elections 
successfully adopted all the forms of pre-independence ‘national’ polls: registration, polling stations, 
ballot boxes and papers.90 The Kingdom borrowed the services of the Uganda’s Supervisor of 
Elections – a British official – and sent the bills for the costs of the elections to the Protectorate 
government.91 Yet the Buganda elections were run as a Kingdom event, not a national one. Managed 
largely by the chiefs, they allegedly saw widespread intimidation and other malpractice.92 This was 
Bugandan ‘neo-traditionalism’ at its most creative, seizing the forms and processes devised to assert 
a unitary Ugandan state, and using them to subvert it: 89 per cent of registered voters turned out to 
cast ballots under the watchful eyes of their chiefs.93 
Nationalist politicians and activists, then, seized upon the ballot both as a demonstration of 
collective political maturity and as a tool to induct a restive public into citizenship. Through 
elections, they sought to remind the public of the state’s ambitions to manage the passage to the 
future and to prevent the fabric of that state from crumbling just as they took possession of it. Yet 
that success entailed the abandonment of other possible futures too, though none quite realised 
this at the time. The essence of African nationalism was futurity, and its rhetoric was often 
ambitiously pan-African; while vehemently opposed to breaking down the colonial state, nationalist 
leaders readily expressed enthusiasm for the project of regional and continental unity. But as some 
foresaw at the time, electoral reliance on the administrative architecture of the colonial territory – 
the basis of the alliance of interests between colonial officials and emergent nationalists – helped 
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undermine both regional integration and pan-Africanism. 94  Pinned to electoral legitimacy, the 
colonial territory became indistinguishable from the aspiring nation.  
IV 
Why did significant numbers of people register, and vote – subjecting themselves to bureaucratic 
process, and queuing at the polling station under the watchful eye of the police to have their names 
ticked off and their fingers inked? What kind of citizenship, or adulthood, did they hope for? 
Coercion played a role. The colonial state was violent – most dramatically in Kenya, but in the other 
cases too, people had become habituated to the physical enforcement of state demands. When 
chiefs in Ghana ‘beat gong-gong’ to call their subjects to register as voters, they evoked a history of 
occasional violence and intimidation. In Kenya and Uganda, the summons from tribal police or 
chiefs’ messengers was the everyday reality of a coercive state. The processes of elections, reliant as 
it was on that administrative machinery, constantly reminded the public of the state’s potential for 
force.  But the success of the electoral process lay in its ability to do more than justify or euphemize 
violence. While nationalists saw the elections as a disciplinary performance, voters may have 
understood them rather differently: as Peter Pels has observed of late-colonial elections in 
Tanganyika, this kind of event ‘always carries a potential for multiple interpretations’.95 The ballot 
offered a contract:  if people voted, their chosen representatives would bring them the prize of 
future prosperity.96 
Formally, parties dominated the final elections before independence in all three countries. A 
feature of electoral politics in Ghana from the 1951 election, parties developed a little more slowly 
in Uganda – where they played an uncertain role in the 1958 elections – and in Kenya, where 
national parties were formally banned until the end of the 1950s. Organizationally, these parties 
varied significantly in their abilities, but even the CPP – perhaps the most effective – was chronically 
unable to enforce internal discipline and was dogged by disputes over the choice of local 
candidates.97 All parties rested on a larger or smaller coalition of influential individuals spread across 
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the country, who lent their local support in the expectation that this would bring them personal 
benefits and further enhance their local status: the fundamental assumption was that control of the 
government, and therefore of the state, was the key to prosperity.98  In Uganda, this took religious 
as well as individual, local and ethnic form; the popularity of the DP was driven partly by the sense 
among Catholics that the colonial state had systematically favoured Protestants.99 The state 
sprawled across the late colonial formal economy: business licences, government contracts, access 
to market plots, public employment were all – in one way or another – in the hands of government. 
So too, of course, were the improving projects to which late colonialism was devoted – clinics, 
schools, water supplies, roads. The party networks, such as they were, were held together by an 
optimistic sense of the possible rewards of office. Across Ghana, Kenya and Uganda campaigns 
rested not on the manifestos – which all parties produced, in English, for the tiny group who could or 
would read these – but on the spoken word. Though it was delivered partly by radio – in broadcasts 
that were subject to a degree of censorship that diminished over time, and which in Kenya were 
made only by explicitly ‘national’ parties  – the real medium for this spoken message was a 
combination of rallies, smaller public meetings and canvassing.100  
In Ghana, the rallies were from the start noisy and ebullient.101 In Uganda and especially in 
Kenya, they began as much more constrained affairs, closely scrutinised and managed. 102  But they 
soon became more noisy and theatrical, and occasionally violent.103 In Kenya, in particular, the police 
remained a prominent presence, ready and very willing to intervene with batons and tear gas.104  
Against the bureaucratic order of the register and the polling station, rallies – when not curtailed by 
the police – performed an order of personal ties and affective loyalty. Women were prominent in 
them, not usually as speakers but as singers, dancers, and as part of the audience which prayed, and 
sang and shouted, and sometimes jeered.105 For the parties that emphasised rapid independence, 
rather than constitutional safeguards – CPP, UPC, KANU – the promise of the rallies was simple: to 
vote was to secure the future. As the UPC’s John Kakonge told a crowd in 1961, immediate 
independence was necessary because ‘”[w]e are in a terrible hurry to bridge the gap between our 
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poverty-stricken country and the prosperous nations of the western world”’.106 By contrast, those 
parties – like KADU, or NLM – that made an explicit appeal to regional loyalties mixed the promise of 
rewards to a local following with warnings of the danger of domination by others.107 Rallies involved 
the promise of more specific, often mundane, material rewards: from clinics and piped water to 
jerseys for fishermen.108  So it was that in the wake of the 1963 elections, KANU’s central officials 
were bombarded with complaints from branch officials and activists who had lent vehicles, given 
fuel, danced and campaigned for the party, and now demanded jobs, contracts and – quite simply – 
payment.109  
Colonial populations had experienced the state as unpredictable and wilful. They had been 
told repeatedly that development would transform their lives, yet suspected that the real benefits of 
prosperity were being withheld from them. Elections embodied an exhilarating offer. This was the 
chance, at last, to make their own demands on the state. Yet voters were not convinced that the 
ballot itself was sufficient to ensure accountability; they wanted candidates on whom they had other 
moral claims, of kinship or shared ethnicity, or at least locality. Such claims were reinforced by the 
everyday clientelism which vivified social relationships in all three countries: attendance and 
donation at funerals, petty financial help, and favours all embedded the personal nature of political 
relationships.110 Nkrumah’s repeated attempts to control the selection of CPP constituency 
candidates were always undercut by patterns of local preference and patronage; official KANU 
candidates faced ‘KANU independents’ who claimed local endorsement.111 From the outset, 
campaign costs included displays of wealth, and the buying of food and drink for voters, intended to 
demonstrate the candidate’s acceptance of this responsibility to share wealth with one’s 
community.112 While administrators imagined the ballot as an assertion of the primacy of 
bureaucratic rationality and orderly citizenship, voters sought to use it to root the new political 
dispensation in a more familiar logic of moral accountability – a citizenship rooted in clientship, 
ethnicity and locality, rather than the nation: as one observer noted of Uganda’s 1958 elections, ‘The 
voting public appeared to be insistent upon learning with some precision from the candidates what 
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each one thought he could do . . . to benefit the people of his district’.113  Aspiring leaders, drawn as 
they were to the vision of the bureaucratic state, were required to join in that local negotiation of 
accountability. Against this backdrop, it was not long before votes were using elections not to 
perform obedience, but to accuse their representatives of aiming to enrich themselves rather than 
reward their communities: ‘they say we are seeking big cars’, as one candidate mournfully told a 
newspaper reporter.114 
V 
British politicians and officials made sense of the collapse of their authority through elections which 
pretended to resolve the contradictions of empire, and looked to the possibility of an imperial 
afterlife rooted in institutional continuity. African politicians and activists, their gaze fixed on a 
prosperous future, had seized upon the ballot as a means to demand independence by 
demonstrating the maturity of the new nation, and to discipline its new citizens. Yet despite the 
hopeful imaginings of political theorists – and the cheerful pretence of politicians and officials – 
adult suffrage and the secret ballot did not immediately remake the dissatisfied subjects of 
colonialism into the citizens of the new nation. Faced by a state that had created itself through 
violence, and had existed beyond moral accountability, yet which promised development, people 
across Ghana, Uganda and Kenya willingly voted. But when it came to making claims on those whom 
they sent to wrest the prizes of development from the state, they looked for accountability not to 
the bureaucratic rationale of the self-consciously modern state, but to personal ties, to kinship, 
ethnicity and locality.  
In all three cases, the glum prophecy of ‘Democracy in backward countries’ initially appeared 
to be accurate – at least, on one level. Elections and government on the Westminster model were 
not maintained, though the path away from them was different in each case.  In Ghana, Nkrumah’s 
pride in his success at the ballot was mixed with an uneasy awareness that parochial preference, 
rather than CPP edict, determined the success of parliamentary candidates. The combination led him 
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to increasingly authoritarian post-independence electoral experiments which culminated in the farce 
of the 1965 elections, in which no ballots were cast and the CPP selected all the members of 
parliament. Less than a year later, the military overthrew him, to public celebrations. In Kenya, the 
administrative hypertrophy and habits of violence consequent on the counter-insurgency campaign 
of the 1950s meant that elections were particularly closely organized, and heavily policed. Here, 
more than elsewhere, a new cadre of African administrators and security officers could see elections 
as an exercise in order and an expression of their power, not a challenge to it; and independent 
Kenya continued to hold regular elections, though under an effective single-party system.115 In 
Uganda, the opportunistic deal agreed by Obote and the British to secure the 1962 elections 
effectively endorsed Buganda’s claims to a distinct status: those who lived in the kingdom were the 
kabaka’s subjects before they were citizens of Uganda. The result was a particularly weak 
independent state, lacking legitimacy at its geographical and economic core, in which every 
subsequent attempt at an election has been problematic.  
Yet while neither imperial nor nationalist plans were to be quite what they claimed, the 
entanglement of the end of empire with the electoral process was of lasting significance. In these 
three territories, as elsewhere in Africa, elections helped mobilize popular endorsement – or at least 
acceptance – of a decolonization process that turned multiple possibilities into a single future. 
Elections narrowed the field of nationalist action to the colonial territory. They exalted literacy and 
formal education, gendered access to political office, and conferred primacy on a group of relatively 
young men who were to dominate politics for the next two decades. At the same time, the nature of 
political competition circulated and normalized a modernist late-colonial rhetoric which insisted that 
legitimate authority rested on development.  
Late-colonial elections – and the politics around them – also embedded a set of linkages: 
between adult suffrage by secret ballot and national and individual adulthood. The idea that adults 
had the right to vote, and that government should derive its authority from the ballot, proved far 
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more enduring than the idea that elections should involve popular choice over policy.116  At the same 
time the behaviour of voters and politicians had foregrounded the idea that, in the pursuit of 
development, the task of elected candidates was to secure benefits for their community – local, or 
ethnic. ‘Operation elections’ may have been conceived as a national project; but the parochial logics 
of clientship which underwrote its apparent success were to persist, and continue to shape electoral 
politics in Africa to the present. 
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